Intelligent design claims that the best explanation for the some of the features found in the cosmos and biotic reality is that they are the result of intelligent activity (i.e. a designer). This obviously begs the question about the designer. Many ID proponents view the question of the designer as a separate issue from design detection. Whether or not this is a fair assessment can be subtle. I certainly agree that detecting design, per se, does not itself entail identifying the designer of a particular religious tradition. However, in my view there is an undeniable reliance on analogy in design theory even if the analogy being drawn is from human intelligence. But analogies are not just being drawn on the ID side. Many of the theological arguments against ID come from analogies as well.

An inference of design in evolution necessarily creates a “picture” of the attributes of the design process and the designer. When one looks at the “designs” in nature it is a natural tendency to compare them and the “picture” with analogies to human design and human designers. This is the source of many theological objections to ID. One common argument could be called the argument from imperfection. The argument goes something like this: Human designers would be expected to make design mistakes but not God. Why couldn’t God design a universe well enough so that no “corrections” are necessary. If God has to tweak things from time to time this presents a picture of God as an inadequate designer constantly making changes to “get it right”. Many feel uncomfortable with this picture of God. Howard Van Til’s claim that God “fully gifts” the cosmos is an example of an attempt to save the perfection of God and thus reject the ID claim that the designer continually acts in evolution. In his approach God gets it right from the beginning and doesn’t need to stop by from time to time and make adjustments. Here’s a statement from Catholic, biologist Kenneth Miller:

The ironic thing is that the proponents of intelligent design actually don’t think that. Because they don’t think that the universe is well enough designed to make the evolution of life inevitable. They think constant intervention on the part of the creator is required to bring about the first life, the first living cell, the first chordate, the first insect, the first bird. In other words, the designer or the creator had to keep tinkering with it. So, in away, In think most biologists look at the universe and have a grander appreciation for the orderliness of the universe based on what many of us regard as the almost inevitability of the evolution of living things.

However, if taken as a general principal, this also would either preclude divine activity entirely or lead to some theological contrivances.

The other argument from imperfection claims that the “imperfections” in biotic design could not possibly be attributed to an all knowing and all powerful God. A God who is perfect would not create designs that are imperfect. Using an analogy to human design again it goes something like this: No self respecting designer would design the spine in such a way that back problems are common. Or no self respecting designer would design the eye with a blind spot. Or no good designer would adopt a trial and error approach to evolution. Strangely this argument from imperfect is the same made by many atheists against the existence of God.

Are these powerful theological objections? They can be but only if one opts for the theology of God that is inherent in them. On the other hand these theologies do not reflect the only possible prominent theologies of God both inside and outside religious traditions. They offer only a narrow theological perspective. It stems in my view dating back to early Greek characterizations like that of Plato who felt that God was so perfect there had to be a demiurge between God and the world. It creates a static (perfect) view of God that has been challenged time and time again. While it is understandable that terms like perfection, omniscience, omnipresence, omnipotence offer a ready way to talk about the ultimacy of God, if taken alone they can distort a picture of God from that which is found in the historic traditions. The incarnation schemes in religion all talk about God participating in finite and temporal reality. A common shorthand in many religions is that “God is a living God”. The metaphor of a suffering God is another example. It is only in a classic theism that one finds a monopolar description of the God/World relationship. It was Aquinas’ position that God affects the world but is not affected by it. An alternative to this position that has become more prevalent in theology is a dipolar theism where God both affects the world and the world affects God. In other words God changes. This contradicts the static “perfectionist” model of God without destroying God’s ultimacy. In this model God has aspects (Xenophanes, Plato’s expanded solution in Timaeus, Ramanuja with his attributes) and even trinitarian concepts.

The point is that theological objections based the notion of a perfect designer ignore theologies of God where God accepts some level of constraint (finite, temporal, epistemological, etc.) It also ignores the kenotic concepts (God limiting God’s self in living) found in Christian and Hindu theology. Life is constrained being. Should it be any wonder that the divine life also accepts and works within the constraints of life according to the divine purpose. Therefore, it should not be thought that the designer theological objections obtain without challenge. The question for the theist is which characterization of God is most compelling.

The other major source of theological objections stems from the acceptance of a dualistic metaphysic. In this metaphysic God and the world have in some sense an ontological independence. The world is “natural” in the sense of being constituted by intrinsic properties of “things” (atoms, quarks, strings, loops, etc.) where as God is totally outside of spacetime. This ontology naturally sets up an interventionist model for divine action that, in my view, should be resisted. Theologically it poses serious problems when relating to science because it sustains the “god of the gaps” objection. It also presents God as a tinkerer in “natural order” or a violator of natural processes. It is understandable, in my view, that this picture of God is rejected by many, particularly those who take science seriously.

This dualistic theological also has prominent and powerful challenges in both ancient and contemporary theology. Prominent among these are panentheistic theologies found both in traditional and process systems. Of course panentheistic systems vary, but most reject intervention as the source of divine activity. Instead the world is, in some sense, “in” God. The use of the “in” term creates an important issue for panentheistic thought and will need to be unpacked in subsequent threads, but the overall point is that divine agency need not be framed as something outside intervening in our world but instead God acting, in some sense, upon God’s self. Various non-interventionists processes have been suggested such as Polkinghorne’s “active information” and top-down causation as described by various theologians. My view on this is that the atomistic and intrinsicality based metaphysics predominant in the West does not fit the empirical evidence and should be replaced with one that is more organic and emergent. Although I disagree with the theology of God in process thought, its emphasis on events (occasions of experience) as constituting reality offers a helpful therapeutic to the atomistic and mechanistic metaphysic. Forms of idealism and panprotopsychism also offer, in my view, fruitful areas of exploration.

For the theist attempting to evaluation the designer theological objections it is necessary to extrapolate those objections to the theology as a whole. I believe it is often the case that when that is done it presents a picture of God that many theists would not find compelling.